Mindwar vs. Bodywar:The cases of India, Pakistan, China and Taiwan

The travails now being faced by the United States in Iraq — despite the robust and uncritical assistance given to Washington by capitals such as Canberra, Warsaw and London — has marked the end of the period when the US could be confident that its economic and other strengths would be sufficient to mould situations in other countries to its specifications. Before and during the planning for the necessary campaign to force through regime change in Baghdad, policymakers in the Pentagon disregarded any except the Euro-centric voices that dismissed the need for a visible Iraqi component in the overall execution of the war strategy. The campaign against Saddamite Iraq was carried out in that country entirely by alien forces without any Iraqi — or indeed Arab — involvement. As a consequence (as for example predicted by the author in the July 2002 Indian Defense Review), while the conventional campaign took the form of a duck shoot, the aftermath has proved less tractable. A UN cover is unlikely to improve matters, given that the organization is associated in the Iraqi mind with the harsh sanctions of the past decade and the insensitivity with which inspections to detect weapons were carried out under Richard Butler.

Whether it is the search for peace in the neighbourhood of Israel or the development of Kosovo into a genuinely multi-religious territory, thus far the post-Cold War forays of the US into nation-building and regional stabilisation have been failures. Hopefully, the lessons from Iraq 2003/2004 will result in a strategy that relies not simply on brute force but emphasizes efforts to ensure that Mindwar rather than just Bodywar is successful. Winning the “mindwar” would imply the planning and execution of measures that would generate the consent and co-operation of local populations in the activities carried out within their territories by the Great Powers. In contrast, a “bodywar” victory just means that the number of body bags is much higher for the population targetted rather than for the targetting force. In such situations, the sullen mood of the local population would result in the creation of a resistance to the goals of the occupying authority that would be a mixture of peaceful and violent. All that a bodywar “victory” would achieve would be to begin a process of attrition that in time would demoralize and drive away the occupying force. In today’s world of the global information village, only a “mindwar” victory can result in a stable post-conflict situation.

Such a victory cannot come about simply by force of arms. In the West Bank, the military advantage of Israel is overwhelming against the Palestinians, and yet that democracy is enduring a continuing stream of casualties as a result of terrorist actions. The mental infrastructure of terror is manifesting its effectiveness and resilience, being sustained by the reverses suffered by Israel in the Mindwar, even while the Israel Defense Forces score “victory” after “victory” in the Bodywar. Although the destruction of the homes of suicide bombers is having a dampening effect on the number of those willing to kill themselves to murder Israelis, yet the positive effect of this is being swamped by the negative fallout of other steps, such as the manner in which a “security zone” has been implemented within the West Bank and Gaza. This zone has made normal economic activity impossible in the locations where it is operative. The situation in the region is similar to that which prevailed in northern Sri Lanka, where the conflict between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and the Sri Lankan army resulted in the shutting down of commerce in the Jaffna region and a ballooning of the ranks of the unemployed there, factors that fuelled recruitment to the LTTE. Unless economic activity in the territories administered by the Palestinian Authority (and the present author has several times repeated that this should be the land left over after Israel has secured enough space for security) is allowed to resume and individuals within the zone enabled to function freely, and unless young Palestinians have a choice other than the present one of either joining a terrorist network or remaining unemployed, the unstable security situation in the neighbourhood of Israel will continue.

The United States is an international superpower that for a decade was considered a “hyperpower” (which may be defined as a single power that can dominate any other country or combination of countries by its strength). However, Washington is proving itself unable to subdue an Iraqi populace that for three decades acquiesced in the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein, a form of government substantially more harsh than that put in place under Paul Bremer. Israel is a regional superpower, and yet the IDF has been unable to eliminate hostile activity in any part of the territory that it operates in. In contrast, despite the help given by Pakistan to the mujahideein in Kashmir as well as funding from Saudi Arabia, India has been able to contain the nonconventional war that the counry is waging in Kashmir with Taliban-like elements since 1989. This is being done without the use of military aircraft or armour or artillery. Such restraint in the use of firepower is unlike the tactics employed by the IDF in the Palestinian areas or by the US in Iraq, or by Russia in Chechnya. In these three theatres, fighter aircraft, helicopters, tanks and artillery are extensively used. Geopolitically, at regular intervals the US, the EU, the PRC and influential states such as Saudi Arabia have collectively applied pressure on India at different times to make concessions designed to satiate at least a portion of Pakistan’s desire to take over the Indian-administered part of the state of Jammu and Kashmir. Had there been a popular resistance in Kashmir of the virulence seen in the Palestinian areas or which is now developing in Iraq, it would have been impossible for New Delhi to resist such pressure, as the internal situation would have spun out of the control of its security forces. However, not despite but because of a concentration of attention on Mindwar rather than on Bodywar, (as for example the “Sadbhavana” scheme launched by the Indian army in Kashmir), New Delhi was able to surmount both external as well as internal pressure for a change in the status quo in Kashmir.

Unlike Israel, two major powers have crossed “international norms” repeatedly while dealing with insurgencies. These are Russia and the PRC, in Chechnya and Xinjiang respectively. Absence of publicity has helped to obscure the tactics being used against local Muslim resisters to rule by Moscow and Beijing, although the ferocity of the retaliation has not snuffed out the insurgency. Should the information blanket now covering up actions of the security forces in Chechnya and Xinjiang lift, the “international community “ (sometimes identified by western foreign policy establishments as shorthand for themselves) may find it difficult to justify the inactivity of the US and the EU when confronted with such actions, an inactivity that is regarded as being caused by the need for the EU and the US to engage commercially and strategically with Moscow and Beijing. In theatres such as the region around Israel, which have the presence of what may be called the “24-hour television news channel”, combatants from democratic entities have being forced to dampen the volume and type of firepower employed by them in tackling local situations. Whether it is in the West Bank or in Iraq, neither the Israeli Defense Forces nor the US military finds itself in a position where it can utilise — or even deploy — even a fraction of the firepower available to it. The use of nuclear weapons or chemical weapons, to quote just two examples, are off-limits. So also any attack that involves a significant number of civilian casualties. The second restriction is lethal in a situation in which the enemy uses civilians as a screen behind which to hide and to disappear into after a sortie.

Just as India has gained by showing restraint in Kashmir, the avoidance of mass killing of civilians by the U.S. and Israel — despite efforts at provoking them into precisely such actions — is ensuring that potentially both countries can still emerge victors in the Mindwar against their foes, whereas if they went the way of Russia and the PRC in Chechnya and Xinjiang, then the “victory” that they would thereby secure would be Pyrrhic. The Middle East would not merely fester as at present, but would soon poison the entire “bloodstream” of international activity.

What is the relevance of these examples to the situation being faced by the PRC in its confrontation with Taiwan? Substantial. For it is the argument here that a policy of force against Taiwan would devastate not just that entity but the Mainland itself. The PRC would face a situation similar to that of France in 1918, which (along with the US and other allies) “defeated” Germany but weakened itself to such a degree in the process that it succumbed to the same power 22 years later. Were there to be a war launched by the PRC against Taiwan, the economic prosperity that is the foundation of the Chinese peoples acquiescence in the unelected rule of the Communist Party would be destroyed, and the resulting instability would begin a chain reaction that would lead to the overthrow of the CCP and to the possible balkanization of the PRC. In trying to gain for itself the territory of Taiwan by the use of force, Beijing is like ly to begin a chain reaction that within a 15-year period could lead it to lose Xinjiang, Tibet and several other regions, which would assert their separateness once the central authority has been enervated by the economic meltdown caused by war across the Taiwan Straits.

The PRC, largely as a consequence of the close links between the PLA and the Pakistan army, has been in the forefront of the diplomatic chorus that India should show “restraint” while dealing with Pakistan. This is good advice, one that has been followed in practice, though occasionally disregarded publicly. In 2002, the Vajpayee government not among the most capable that the country has had in its history as a republic — mobilized and transported two hundred thousand additional troops to the border with Pakistan, thus creating an international scare that war was imminent. In reality, there was a zero intention to wage war, because of the realization in New Delhi that such a conflict would harm India substantially while giving it meager long-term benefits. While the conventional superiority of the Indian military could be expected to prevail over that of Pakistan, and the robust Indian second-strike capability would have prevented the conflict from going nuclear, the economic cost of such a war to India would have been immense. During the past few years, India had been emerging as an investment destination that was creating the kind of attention that was shown to China in the 1980s. The troop mobilization killed much of such sentiment, and only the slow realization that war between India and Pakistan is much less likely than that between Taiwan and the PRC has brought back foreign investors. The only country that has gained from the show of machismo by the Vajpayee government has been the PRC, for which India as a competitor for foreign investment.

The malefic effects of the 2002 mobilization of Indian troops on the border with Pakistan — which included a flurry of travel advisories by key countries such as the US advising their nationals to leave India immediately — resulted in significant and unpublicised pressure by domestic business on the Union Government to avoid such sabre-rattling in future. Key components of the economy, such as the Information Technology sector, warned that it would be forced to relocate to Singapore or other locations were such induced tensions to continue. As a result of the recognition of the negative economic consequences of creating an atmosphere of tension, New Delhi once again began emphasizing the “peace” track with Pakistan. The velvet glove has covered the mailed fist. Not coincidentally, investment into the country as well as its foreign exchange reserves have gone up, as has the rate of growth of critical sectors, including knowledge-based industries. It would be well for Beijing to look carefully at the Indian experience, so that it factors in the cost to PRC economic life of a policy of scaling up tensions with Taiwan. Only a situation where war is no longer an option between the PRC and Taiwan would release the full potential of East Asia, a process in which China would be the principal gainer.

To revert to the Indian subcontinent, by its obsession with conflict, the Pakistan army has emerged as a severe impediment to that country’s prosperity. Were the PLA to insist on keeping alive the prospect of the use of force in dealing with Taiwan, it would become as much of a drag on the prosperity of China as its counterpart is in Pakistan.

Just as the Pakistan army has sought to create a myth that public opinion in that country is willing to risk nuclear annihilation for the sake of getting the whole of Kashmir, hardline elements within the CCP and the PLA claim that the “Chinese people” insist on the “reunification of Taiwan with the Mainland” and that therefore the use of force may need to be activated at some stage, especially were Taipei to give a formal declaration of independence. Such a view is an insult to the rationality of the Chinese people, who are as peace-loving as any other, and for whom a life free of the poverty of the past is the main priority.

The reality is that just as most Pakistanis are no longer willing to allow the “Kashmir issue” to be used as the excuse to fund an immense military establishment, fewer and fewer people in the Mainland would be ready to accept an economic and consequent social and political meltdown as the consequence of a war with Taiwan. Such a conflict would immediately choke off China’s exports and impact negatively on the immense investments in both capital and goodwill that Beijing has made internationally since the Deng Era. Militarily, the effort at conquest would run into severe difficulties, in view of the natural barrier between the Mainland and Taiwan, as well as the existence of missile systems that can take out naval and other craft approaching Taiwanese shores.

Significantly, the prospect of a war in the region of the Taiwan Straits may speed up the creation of what the author has enunciated (in September 2002) under the name of “Asian NATO”. The proposed North America Asia Treaty Organization would link Kuwait, Oman, Bahrain, Qatar, Australia, India, Singapore, Japan and South Korea into an alliance that would guarantee security to every democracy in Asia, a category that would include Taiwan. Thus, an attack on Taiwan would be met by a response from the new alliance, converting a regional conflict into an international one. It is unlikely that any country would step forward to assist the PRC against the countries that are planned to form part of Asian NATO. Indeed, a few non-members such as Viet Nam may get tempted — or indeed encouraged — to open diversionary fronts in order to get even at past slights. Should the Kim Jong Il regime in North Korea get replaced in the meanwhile, then the Yalu River would be a third front, followed by the Himalayan frontier between India and China. Apart from the War on Terror, the second geopolitical force that is pushing forward the creation of an Asian NATO is the prospect of war between Taiwan and the PRC. Were Beijing to abjure the use of force against Taiwan, then one of the main justifications for an Asian NATO would cease to exist.

Of course, an alliance of Asian and North American states that has the twin objectives of (a) defense against Terror and (b) the protection of democracies in Asia from assault by states that are authoritarian, is desirable in itself, in that it can serve as both a defense as well as a deterrent. The advantage in a democracy is that the decision-taking mechanisms need to factor in public opinion while formulating and implementing policy, and the adoption of measures that go against public interest get thus constrained. In an authoritarian structure, such restraints are fewer, with the result that policies that are destructive of peace, internal stability and external responsibility may get adopted. Pakistan is again an example. Barring the 1948 conflict, all other wars with India have taken place during the periods of direct rule by the Pakistan army. Even in the limited conflict in Kargil in 1999, it was the Pakistan army that was the initiator of the effort to take over additional territory in Kashmir that led to a matching response by the Indian military. In the case of the PRC, the ruling structures are independent of the public, and hence have a higher risk of adopting decisions that may not be in the overall interest of the Mainland population. Rather, such decisions may reflect the sectional perceptions and perceived interests of segments such as the PLA, the entity that is in the vanguard of a “War as the preferred Option” line on Taiwan, an option that — if exercised — would destroy the PRC economy and social stability.

The creation of an Asian NATO, far from being a destabilizing influence, would in fact be a confidence-building mechanism, in that the creation of such an alliance would sharply reduce the risk of war. This it would do by making prohibitively expensive the cost of such a war to the PRC, as well as reducing to insignificance the probability that the PLA would prevail. A combined defense of Taiwan by the US, Canada, Australia, Japan, India and other states would prove a sufficient shield against a military takeover of the island. Thus an Asian NATO would ensure peace across the Taiwan Straits.

The parallels between the self-defeating approaches of the Pakistan army over Kashmir and that of the PLA concerning Taiwan are many. In both cases, the militaries continue to put forward a military solution that is inherently non-viable. By keeping the exercise of such an option within the realm of probability, regional tensions have been created that affect the climate for growth. For China as much as is the case for India, a policy of restraint is needed in order for the full economic potential to be realized.

In the case of the PRC, there exists an attractive option to force in its quest for closer links with Taiwan. This is economic and societal intermingling. Should peace continue in the region, and the Mainland’s rate of economic growth continue to remain high, then the prospects are high for China to be the core of a new geopolitical pole that will stand alongside the US and the EU as one of the three loci of strategic muscle in the world. The “China pole” would include Taiwan, Korea and in time Japan, besides much of ASEAN. Already, there is a steady flow of capital and (albeit temporary) migration between Taiwan and the PRC, caused by economic and human pulls. As a result, a powerful constituency has developed in both locations that has a vested interest in good relations between them. Over time, if these ties increase, the links between the PRC and Taiwan would multiply, and in effect there would be a confluence between them. Of course, the migratory flow would be one way, as Taiwan would not find it feasible to permit unrestricted Mainlander entry into its territory, when even Hong Kong is wary of a possible flood of economic migrants from the rest of China.

The geopolitical effect of an increase in economic linkages is visible in the case of South Korea. During the past decade, Seoul has visibly changed its approach to Beijing, and has distanced itself from Washington in several respects, including on policy towards Pyongyang. Today, the South Korean position on how to deal with the rogue regime in Pyongyang is much closer to that of Beijing than it is to Washington or Tokyo. As for Japan, given the steady drift of Japanese investment into China and the flow of human business and tourist traffic there, over the next decade, a South Korea-like situation may develop, in which Tokyo too begins to distance itself from Washington and align itself closer to Beijing. The recent call by PRC Premier Wen Jiabao to the ASEAN states to cooperate with China indicates an awareness of the value of Butter Diplomacy over that of Gun Diplomacy in dealing with the PRC’s neighbourhood. Such a factor operates in the case of Taiwan as well. All that the bellicose rhetoric and threatening gestures of the Jiang-Zhu period did were to drive more Taiwanese electors away from parties that were Beijing-friendly. Had the warlike gestures continued, the result would have been a severe erosion of the Mainland’s ability to attract foreign investment, and retain access to markets that are strategically committed to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question, such as the United States.

Indeed, if it taken as fact that the PRC leadership views the island as a province and not a country, then it is illogical to object to a redefinition that replaces the pretentious “Republic of China” with the simple, accurate “Taiwan”. By calling itself the Republic of China, Taipei is in fact undermining the concept of “One China”, by implying that there are two Chinas. Such an implication would be absent were the name to be substituted with “Taiwan”. As for the other components that go with international recognition, presumably little of that would change. Neither the US nor any of the countries having “cultural and trade” missions in Taiepei would upgrade such facilities to Embassy level. Thus, a renaming of the Republic of China as Taiwan may assuage local sentiment on the island and act to prevent more confrontational steps, such as a formal declaration of independence. By seeking to block even such cosmetic gestures to a Taiwanese public that is overwhelmingly in favour of a separate identity for the island, the PRC risks the coming into office of elements which may push for a crossing of the “Red Line” by declaring openly what is implicit: that Taiwan is independent of any outside authority. In their search for he full loaf, even the half in the possession of the PRC may vanish. Here again, the Indian and Pakistani approaches come to mind. While Islamabad, oblivious to ground realities, continues its economically and socially suicidal quest for parity with India, New Delhi has quietly accepted the status quo and tailors its investment only to the level needed to maintain it, rather than follow Pakistan in a quixotic quest for an improvement over the present position, in terms of extra territory.

To forcibly unify Taiwan with the PRC would be akin to swallowing poison. The people of the Island would become a permanent source of disloyalty to the Beijing regime, ultimately even turning to violence in order to regain sovereignty over their territory. The economic future of China would become bleak, as the country moves from a business partner of the west to pariah status, blocked from markets and technology. A naval quarantine would be put into place around the east coast of China, that would choke to insignificance the economic infrastructure there. This would result in the thus far quiescent class of professionals in the Mainland turning against a regime that guarantees not prosperity but ruin. Eventually, the effect would be to create unrest that would fuel conditions on the mainland similar to those that became operative in eastern Europe in the 1980s.

The only pro-China option for the CCP would be to continue the process whereby economic factors result in a steady bonding between Taiwan and the PRC. As already mentioned, in the view of the author, the renaming of the island from the Republic of China to Taiwan should be a compromise solution that counteracts the pull towards an explicit declaration of independence. There is little doubt that such an explicit declaration would not be in Taiwan’s best interests, in that it would unify pro-war sentiment in the PRC to a level that may make conflict inevitable. Contrarily, a mere renaming would not have such an effect, being a red rag only to the PLA and to conservative elements within the CCP. In no country should the military be allowed to drive either domestic or foreign policy. The pragmatic regime led by President Hu Jintao can be expected to avoid the extreme reaction of resort to force in a situation other than an explicit declaration of independence.

Once the use of force is eschewed in a situation in which “nationalist” sentiment in Taiwan has been assuaged by the renaming of the island, confidence would be generated worldwide that the PLA will not be allowed to abort economic progress in East Asia by plunging the region towards war. The result would be a willingness in Taipei to enhance the volume and form of cross-Strait relations, thus leading to communication between Taiwan and the PRC that is as free as that between Taiwan and its ASEAN partners. Such a step would be feasible only after the PRC makes its peaceful intent clear by refusing to get provoked by the merely cosmetic gesture of a change in name of the island. Thus, changing the name of the territory from the Republic of China to Taiwan would act in a positive way by sufficiently satisfying “nationalist” sentiments within the island without crosing a boundary that may generate public opinion in the PRC that makes conflict almost inevitable. While authoritarian structures do not usually factor in public benefit while framing policies they consider essential to their own survival, a strong undertow of public opinion can lead to extreme reactions. Thus, paradoxically, an authoritarian structure may on occasion be more sensitive to the public mood than an elected administration. A declaration of independence by Taiwan would create an immense nationalistic fervor in the PRC that would enhance support within the CCP for the worst-case option of conflict. It may be remembered that the 1914–18 World War was immensely popular in most of the key participating capitals.

Thus, the confidence-building mechanisms that are needed to contain the situation in the Taiwan Straits include:

(1) The creation of a security alliance in Asia that underwrites security for, inter alia , Taiwan. This would ensure an international response to an attack on the island, thus raising the cost to the aggressor to a level that would make victory difficult.

(2) Acceptance by the PRC of the need to assuage nationalist sentiment in Taiwan (by tacit acceptance through the mechanism of a formal condemnation sans a military component) of the cosmetic sop of renaming the territory “Taiwan” in place of the “Republic of China”. Such a step would stanch moves towards a formal declaration of independence by satisfying “nationalist” sentiment in the island, whereas a unilateral declraration of independence would have negative consequences Taiwan as well as the PRC by sharply increasing the risk of war.

(3) Preparation of public opinion in both Taiwan as well as the PRC to consider war as a lose-lose option that would devastate the prospects for either to continue on a growth trajectory and ensure a continuation of the rise in the proportion of the populations that are bettering their economic status. Clear statements by the US in particular and other PRC trading partners that the use of force against Taiwan would lead to a break in commercial relations would help moderates within the CCP go over the heads of the radicals in educating Mainland opinion. A clear scenario-building exercise that tabulates the cost to the Mainland of war across the Straits needs to replace the present policy of “ambiguity” over both the intentions of the democratic world vis-a-vis the defense of Taiwan and the effects on the population within the PRC of economic and military counter-measures on China.

(4) Apart fro the negative, the PRC public needs to be presented with a clear exposition of the benefits of a continuation of peace across the Taiwan Straits. This includes the potential for China to be the core of a third geopolitical pole in the emerging international order, together with the US and the EU. In fact, the China pole is likely to be stronger than the European one, as the huge investments needed to bring East European infrastructural, educational and work-attitude standards in line with those in the west will act to lower the competitiveness of European manufactures, especially in a context where the premium enjoyed by a European brand is getting reduced. Were Japan, South Korea and Taiwan to continue on the present “glide path” of steady integration with the economy of China, the resultant technological skills — buttressed by partnership with a Russia that is likely to get disillusioned with Europe and turn once more to the East — may result in the creation of a manufacturing sector that can take on the Europeans even in high-skill items such as the manufacture of aircraft.

(5) A declaration of “No First Use” of missiles or nuclear weapons by any regional entity in East Asia against any other. Of course, the caveat here is that any such commitment from a regime as prone to dissimulation as North Korea would need to be enforced by intrusive verification.

A European Union-style integration seems improbable in East Asia in view of the different political systems that are at work in the region. In particular, the system of governance followed within the PRC does not lend itself to a fit with those of South Korea, Taiwan and Japan. However, a local variant of a Common Market is practicable provided Beijing abjures the use of force in the settlement of regional disputes, including with Taiwan.

The major obstacle to continued prosperity and stability in the high-growth region around the Taiwan Straits is the continuing threat of armed conflict. A No War situation in the region, especially between Taiwan and the PRC, would remove this obstacle to the prosperity that is the birthright of the people of the PRC and Taiwan. War, however, is no longer a viable option between Taipei and Beijing. The sooner this is made explicit by both sides, the better for the world as a whole. The example of India and Pakistan should serve to deter proponents of tension and conflict in other parts of the world. Tensions have robbed both countries of significant volumes of income and growth, and are even today stunting their capabilities and preventing the natural synergy between them. A clear No War situation would unlock the full synergy between Taiwan and the PRC. To this end, several confidence-building masures need to be put in place that ensure that the population of both understand the lose-lose nature of conflict and the win-win outcome of peace.

[An abridged version of this paper was presented at the “International Conference on Converting Confrontation into Cooperation: In Search of Working Peace across the Taiwan Strait”, held at Ambassador Hotel, Taipei on December 9, 2003.]